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First Party Bad Faith in Kentucky:
What Remains After Federal Kemper
Insurance Co. v. Hornback?
INTRODUCTION
An insurance policy is a contract whereby an insurer prom-
ises to compensate the insured on the occurrence of a particular
event.' The insurer retains the right to insert in the policy any
reasonable provision exempting it from certain liability.2 The
insured's compliance with the terms of the insurance contract is
a condition precedent to the right of recovery.' Of course, utmost
good faith is required in the relationship between the insurer
and the insured. 4
An insurer who unreasonably delays settling a pending claim
may be liable for damages.' Traditionally, an insured plaintiff's
recovery for an insurer's wrongdoing has been limited to dam-
ages obtainable in an action for breach of contract-the amount
of payments due under the policy plus legal interest.6
Until 1983, Kentucky courts uniformly followed this tradi-
tional view by holding that damages for breach of a first party
insurance policy7 were limited to the amount due under the
I Wheeler v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 560 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Ky. 1978).
2 Pennsylvania Casualty Co. v. Elkins, 70 F. Supp. 155, 159 (E.D. Ky. 1947);
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dewitt, 82 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Ky. 1935). See also
General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Kinney, 129 S.W.2d 1014, 1017 (Ky. 1939); Federal Union
Life Ins. Co. v. Lambert, 86 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Ky. 1935).
Lemons v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 181 F. Supp. 281, 284-85 (E.D. Ky.
1960), aff'd, 284 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1960).
4 82 S.W.2d at 321.
Service Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Marcum, 386 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Ky. 1965).
Insurance Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. 378, 386 (1872); General Accident Fire &
Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Ky. 1966); Clark v. Life & Casualty
Ins. Co., 53 S.W.2d 968, 969 (Ky. 1932).
7 First party insurance is that "which applies to the insured's own property or
person," e.g., fire insurance. BLACK's LAw DICnONAY 722 (5th ed. 1979).
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contract. 8 In Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,9 how-
ever, the Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized, for the first
time, the tort of first party bad faith.10 After Feathers, an insurer
wrongfully withholding payment of policy proceeds from the
insured could be liable to the insured for punitive damages under
a tort theory regardless of contractual damages. 1 This decision
placed Kentucky in the mainstream of states addressing this
issue. 12
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
first party bad faith in Federal Kemper Insurance Co. v. Horn-
back.3 In a surprising decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court
overruled Feathers, thrusting Kentucky into a minority position
among those states that have considered the tort of first party
bad faith. 14
This Comment first discusses the development of the tort of
first party bad faith in Kentucky and examines its current status
8 See, e.g., 400 S.W.2d at 687; Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 162, 164
(Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
9 667 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
10 This Comment addresses the tort of first party bad faith as opposed to third
party bad faith. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
11 667 S.W.2d at 696. See also Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ky., Inc. v. Whitaker,
687 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
11 "Bad Faith litigation-the attempt to get tort damages for breaches of good
faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts-has become a booming legal market
throughout at least half the nation.. ." Granelli, Good Times For "Bad Faith", Nat'l
L.J., July 11, 1983, at 1, col. 1. See infra note 27.
13 711 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1986).
14 The dissent in Federal Kemper stated, "Our decision to 'overrule' Feathers v.
State Farm ... places us in a minority position squarely in conflict with every other
state that has considered the matter." 711 S.W.2d at 849 (Leibson, J., dissenting). A
minority of the state supreme courts that have addressed the first party bad faith issue,
however, have rejected the tort (most often on the grounds of legislative deferral).
Comment, Bad Faith Refusal of Insurance Companies to Pay First Party Benefits-
Time for the Illinois Supreme Court to Recognize the Tort and Resulting Punitive
Damages, 1984 S. ILL. U.L.J. 121, 127-28. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty
Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 158 (Kan. 1980) (held that Kansas courts do not recognize the
tort of bad faith because the state's legislative remedies are adequate to force insurers
to comply with insurance contracts); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295
N.W.2d 50, 56 (Mich. 1980) (Where insured sought recovery for mental anguish sustained
from insurer's bad faith refusal to pay disability benefits, the court held, "We decline
to follow the California court and to declare the mere bad faith breach of an insurance
indemnity contract an independent and separately actionable tort and to thereby open
the door to recovery for mental pain and suffering caused by breach of a commercial
contract.").
['VoL. 75
FiRST PARTY BAD FAITH
after Federal Kemper. Second, it suggests alternative remedies
for the unjustified denial of an insured's claim by an insurance
company including sanctions imposed by the Kentucky Motor
Vehicle Reparations Act 5 and the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practice section of the Kentucky Insurance Code. 6 Finally, this
Comment discusses the possible private right of action derived
from the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices statute.
I. THE TORT OF FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH
Under the traditional rule of contractual recovery, damages
for an insurer's breach of the insurance contract cannot exceed
the policy limits plus legal interest. 7 Proponents of the tradi-
tional rule assert that awards are not excessive 8 when recovery
is limited to the amount under contract and insurers are more
likely to defend questionable claims. 9 In theory, the resulting
savings are passed on to the consumers through lower premi-
ums.
20
The disadvantages of the traditional rule, however, outweigh
any limited economic benefits.2' The insured is purchasing se-
curity and peace of mind with the reasonable belief that he or
she will be compensated for losses covered under an insurance
agreement.2 Under the traditional rule, however, insurance com-
panies economically are encouraged to deny or delay payment
of valid claims. Because damages for the insurer's breach can-
not exceed the policy limits plus legal interest 2 4 insurers can
KRS §§ 304.39-210(2); 304.39-220(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981).
KRS § 304.12-230 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
" Insurance Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. 378, 386 (1872); General Accident Fire &
Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Ky. 1966); Clark v. Life & Casualty
Ins. Co., 53 S.W.2d 968, 969 (Ky. 1932).
11 See Harvey and Wiseman, First Party Bad Faith: Common Law Remedies and
a Proposed Legislative Solution, 72 Ky. L.J. 141, 167 (1983-84).
I d.
Id. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 999 (Cal. 1978) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
11 See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
12 Note, Tort of Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Claims, 82 W.
VA. L. Ray. 579, 579 (1980). See also Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 667
S.W.2d 693, 696 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
"' Note, supra note 22, at 579.
24 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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maximize their profits by reinvesting wrongfully withheld funds.Y
The unsophisticated insured is likely to settle with the insurer
for an amount well below what he is entitled. If the insured
brings suit on the insurance contract and prevails, the insurer's
only added costs are legal interest and attorneys' fees. 26
In response to this severe inequity favoring liability insurers,
a majority of states now recognize a "bad faith" tort action in
first party insurance contract cases. The theory underpinning
the tort of bad faith is that insurance companies have an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing3z' Although the duty grows
out of the insurance contract, "[it] is independent of the contract
and attaches over and above the terms of the contract. ' 29 The
tort of first party bad faith imposes liability on an insurer who
breaches this implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.30
II. DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH IN KENTUCKY
Kentucky courts have followed the national trend 3' by recog-
nizing the duty of good faith with respect to third party liability
25 Note, supra note 22, at 580.
26 Harvey and Wiseman, supra note 18, at 168.
- See, e.g., Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d 1 (Ala.
1981); Nobel v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866 (Ariz. 1981); Vernon Fire &
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1976); Amsden v. Grinnell Mut.
Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Peterson, 540 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 1975); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979); Christian v. American Home Assurance
Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I.
1980); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978). See Comment,
supra note 14, at 127-28 n.50.
21 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1973) (tort of first
party bad faith first recognized by the California Supreme Court).
Id. at 1040 (emphasis in original).
30 Id. at 1037. The Gruenberg court held that
in every insurance contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. The duty to so act is imminent in the contract whether the
company is attending to the claims of third persons against the insured or
the claims of the insured itself. Accordingly, when the insurer unreasonably
and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject
to liability in tort.
Id. at 1038.
"1 See supra note 27.
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claims ("third party bad faith").3 2 Until 1983, however, Ken-
tucky courts refused to recognize the same fiduciary relationship
with regard to first party claims in which the insured himself or
herself is seeking policy benefits. 3 Kentucky courts uniformly
had held to the traditional rule that damages for breach of a
first party insurance policy were limited to the amount due under
the contract. 34 Punitive damages could not be imposed on the
insurer.31
In 1983, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Feathers v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,36 recognized for the first time the
tort of first party bad faith. 37 In Feathers the court held that,
when an insurer wrongfully withholds payment of proceeds un-
der an insurance policy, the insured may recover punitive dam-
ages for the tortious conduct of the insurer in breaching the
implied covenant of good faith.3" This decision moved Kentucky
into the mainstream of states recognizing the tort of first party
bad faith. 39 In two first party bad faith cases following Feathers,
2 The Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized a fiduciary relationship attaching
to insurance policies in excess-of-the-policy-limits cases (those cases where "the insurer's
failure to settle exposels] the insured to an unreasonable risk of having a judgment
rendered against him in excess of the policy limits[.]"). Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co.
v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 501 (Ky. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1975). Id. Good
faith is required of the insurance company in settling third-party claims against the
insured within the limits of policy coverage. Id. An insurer's breach of this duty of
good faith with regard to third party insurance is known as "third-party bad faith."
See Harvey and Wiseman, supra note 18, at 145 n.25 (A third-party insurance policy is
one that protects the insured from liability claims by third persons.). Note, supra note
22, at 579 n.l.
" See infra notes 34-35.
'4 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ky., Inc. v. Whitaker, 687 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1985). See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400
S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1966); Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977).
" "[T]he measure of recovery for failure to pay money due under the contract is
the amount agreed to be paid. Therefore, no recovery for punitive damages, as sought
by the appellants, can be had, nor consequential damages such as attorney fees, witness
fees, etc." 548 S.W.2d at 164. See also 400 S.W.2d at 687-88; Clark v. Life & Casualty
Co., 53 S.W.2d 968, 969-70 (Ky. 1932); Combs v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 38
S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1931); Cumberland Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Cartwright Creek Tel. Co.,
108 S.W. 875, 878 (Ky. 1908).
667 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
See id. at 696-97.
" Id.
687 S.W.2d at 559. See supra notes 9, 27. -
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the Kentucky Court of Appeals further refined the doctrine by
requiring proof that the insurer acted intentionally, willfully, or
in reckless disregard of the insured's rights before punitive dam-
ages could be awarded.40
III. Federal Kemper Insurance Co. v. Hornback
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
first party bad faith in Federal Kemper Insurance Co. v. Horn-
back.41 In the first examination of the new tort since its recog-
nition by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Feathers,42 the
Kentucky Supreme Court surprisingly overruled Feathers.43
The facts in Federal Kemper are very similar to those in
Feathers. Both cases involved an insurer's refusal to settle with
its policyholder a fire loss claim, on the grounds of suspected
arson. 44 In Federal Kemper, the Hornbacks' house burned 35
days after they increased the amount of fire insurance coverage
with the insurer. 45 Although the evidence clearly indicated arson,
there was little evidence suggesting that the Hornbacks had set
the fire.4 6 After a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of
the Hornbacks on the terms of the policy and for punitive
o 687 S.W.2d at 559 ("[w]e believe that an action for bad faith ... requires
something more than mere negligence.... Mere errors in judgment should not be
sufficient to establish bad faith."); Grimes v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 705 S.W.2d
926, 932 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
1' 711 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1986).
42 Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 667 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983).
43 711 S.W.2d at 845.
4 The facts of Feathers follow: On May 31, 1981, the Feathers' home and personal
belongings were destroyed by fire. The Feathers timely filed a proof of loss with their
insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. This proof of loss was rejected by State Farm
on the grounds that it contained misrepresentations. 667 S.W.2d at 694.
On May 28, 1982 the Feathers filed suit against State Farm to recover for their
losses. The Feathers alleged, among other things, that State Farm owed "a duty to act
in good faith in effecting a fair and reasonable settlement ... without harassment or
unreasonable delay" and that State Farm failed to meet this duty. Id. State Farm, in
its answer, admitted its duty to act in good faith, but alleged the fire gave rise to a
reasonable belief that the house had been burned intentionally by the Feathers, thereby
constituting fraud and voiding the insurance policy. Id.
41 711 S.W.2d at 844.
46 Id. at 844. The dissent in Federal Kemper asserts that there was no evidence
that the Hornbacks set the fire. Id. at 847.
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damages.4 7 Federal Kemper appealed the judgment for punitive
damages. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed and upon
discretionary review the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed. 4
In establishing the new tort of first party bad faith, the court
of appeals in Feathers noted that cases cited by the insurer in
support of the principle that one may not recover punitive dam-
ages for breach of contract were flawed because they contained
modifiers such as "damages ordinarily are not recoverable,'
"usually not allowed," and "not recognized for mere breach. ' 49
The court of appeals interpreted these modifiers to indicate that
exceptions to this principle exist.5 0
In Federal Kemper, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court
quickly dismissed the Feathers analysis. The court found that
"[Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Cartwri&,ht Creek
Telephone Co.]5' stated unequivocally that punitive damages are
not recoverable for a mere breach of contract. ' 5 2 Furthermore,
the court stated that "[General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp. v. Judd]53 gratuitously added ordinarily when it relied
upon and cited Cumberland.' 5 4 The court found that Judd did
not diminish the rule that punitive damages are not available in
contract cases.55
On close reading of these cases, Federal Kemper's summary
dismissal of the court of appeals' analysis in Feathers is unper-
suasive. Cases, although standing for the proposition that pu-
nitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract, do
suggest that such damages might be recoverable under some
circumstances.16 For example, in Cumberland, the court stated,
4 Id. at 844.
'" Id.
667 S.W.2d at 695 (emphasis added).
Id.
- 108 S.W. 875 (Ky. 1908).
12 711 S.W.2d at 845.
" 400 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1966).
'4 711 S.W.2d at 845 (emphasis in original).
" Id.
See McNutt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 369 F. Supp. 381, 385 (W.D.
Ky. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir. 1974) ("In an action based on contracts,
punitive damages are not recoverable generally speaking." (emphasis added)); 400 S.W.2d
at 688 ("[Plunitive damages ordinarily are not recoverable for a breach of contract."
(emphasis added)); 108 S.W. at 878; Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 486
1987]
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"[e]xemplary damages have been almost universally denied in
actions ex contractu, ' 57 and gave an example of when exemplary
damages would be allowed for breach of contract.53
Regardless of whether or not the court of appeals in Feathers
was justified in its reading of prior cases to find a basis for a
tort action, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Federal Kemper
went on to hold that "[tihe only fiduciary relationship we rec-
ognize attaching to insurance policies is the excess-of-the-policy-
limits cases where good faith is required on the part of the
insurance company. ' 59 Federal Kemper flatly asserted that "[t]his
principle of law is contract and not tort and has no application
to insurance contracts generally. Above all, there is no suggestion
that punitive damages would follow breach." 6 The court then
perfunctorily stated that "[s]anctions for a frivolous defense, as
provided for by our rules, are deemed sufficient to deter insur-
ance companies from refusing to pay according to the terms of
the contract without cause.' '61
In overruling Feathers, Federal Kemper leaves no doubt that
Kentucky courts no longer will recognize the tort of first party
bad faith.62 Punitive damages will not follow breach of contract,
even when the insurer acts in bad faith. 3 Regrettably, however,
Federal Kemper failed to explain "why" the Kentucky Supreme
Court chose not to join the decided majority of states that have
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978) ("Kentucky has long followed the general rule that punitive damages
ordinarily are not recoverable for breach of contract.... Nevertheless, this rule permits
a plaintiff to recover punitive damages if the breach of contract also involved tortious
conduct."); Wahba v. Don Corlette Motors, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978) ("Punitive damages are ordinarily not recoverable in a breach of contract action."
(emphasis added)).
108 S.W. at 878 (emphasis added) (quoting 13 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & PROCE-
DTRE 113 (1904); 2 J. SuTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 390 (3d ed.
1903)).
11 At the time Cumberland was decided, there existed "an exception to this general
rule in the case of a breach of contract to marry, in which exemplary damages may be
allowed." Id. at 878 (quoting 13 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAw & PROCEDURE 113).






1987] FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH
considered the issue and recognized the tort. 4 Why is the duty
to act in good faith and fairly in handling a fire loss claim of
an insured held inferior to the duty to accept reasonable settle-
ments from a third party? 65 And why is the court in Federal
Kemper unwilling to recognize an independent duty of good
faith attaching "over and above the terms of the contract? "66
The only apparent reason is a stare decisis rationale. Cumberland
and Judd represent over three-quarters of a century of precedent
that the Kentucky Supreme Court is unwilling to abandon in
favor of the modern concepts recognized in Feathers.6 7 If the
strong national trend toward recognition of the tort of first
party bad faith persists, 6 these questions will become even more
compelling. First party bad faith in Kentucky may be only
dormant rather than dead.
'A At oral argument in Federal Kemper, counsel for the insurer admitted
that in cases of recent vintage "without exception" every jurisdiction
called upon to decide this question has recognized the principle that,
given proper circumstances, an insured may pursue a tort claim against
his own insurer for bad faith failure to pay first party benefits due and
owing under the policy.
Id. at 846 (Leibson, J., dissenting). But see supra note 14.
11 The California Supreme Court in Gruenberg held that "[tihese are merely two
different aspects of the same duty." Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037
(Cal. 1973). See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
" The California Supreme Court held in Gruenberg that "[tihis duty [of good
faith and fair dealing] is independent of the contract and attaches over and above the
terms of the contract.... A tort may grow out of or make a part of, or be coincident
with a contract." 510 P.2d at 1040 (emphasis in original) (quoting Jones v. Kelly, 280
P. 942, 943 (1929)).
17 400 S.W.2d 685; Clark v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 53 S.W.2d 968 (Ky. 1932);
108 S.W. 875; Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
- See supra note 27. The California Supreme Court has even expanded the bad
faith concept to noninsurance contracts.
In holding that a tort action is available for breach of the covenant [of
good faith and fair dealing] in an insurance contract, we have emphasized
the "special relationship" between insurer and insured, characterized by
elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility .... No
doubt there are other relationships with similar characteristics and deserving
of similar legal treatment.
Seamen's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil of Cal., 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (Cal.
1984).
The Court in Seamen's Direct did not decide whether breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in a noninsurance, commercial contract gave rise to a tort
action. The court did hold, however, that a party who breaches a contract and then in
bad faith denies its existence may incur tort remedies. Id. at 1167.
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IV. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES AFTER Federal Kemper
After Federal Kemper,69 the common law remedy for breach
of a first party insurance policy is limited once again to the
amount due under the contract.70 An insured may have limited
statutory redress, however, in that sanctions may be imposed on
insurers under the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act 7'
and the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices section of Kentucky's
Insurance Code.72 In addition, an insured might argue that a
private right of action should be implied from the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices statute. 73
A. Kentucky's Motor Vehicle Reparations Act
Statutes of some states provide for recovery of special dam-
ages and reasonable attorneys' fees when an insurance company
acts in bad faith or without reasonable grounds in refusing or
unreasonably delaying payment of the amount due under the
policy.74 The Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act provides
for such relief.75 The Act provides that a reparations obligor
may be liable for the payment of 18% interest 76 and attorneys'
69 Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, 711 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1986).
70 Id. at 845.
7' Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-210(2); 304.39-220(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1981) [hereinafter KRS]. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
72 KRS § 304.12-230 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986). See infra notes 82-94 and
accompanying text.
" See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
71 See, e.g., Thurston Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Dowling, 535 S.W.2d 63 (Ark. 1976)
(applying ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3238, 66-3901 (1980) when insurer refused to pay full
S8,000 due by the terms of fire insurance policy, court affirmed recovery from insurer
plus statutory penalty, interest, and attorneys' fees); Wheeler v. Employer's Mut. Cas-
ualty Co., 505 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1973) (applying KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-256 (1986) when
insurer refused without just cause or excuse to pay claim arising out of automobile
accident, insured is entitled to attorneys' fees under statute); International Sec. Life Ins.
Co. v. Ramage, 446 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (applying TEx. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 3.62 (Vernon 1981) when insurer failed to settle claim within 30 day period called for
by statute, it is required to pay 12% interest penalty plus attorneys' fees).
1 KRS §§ 304.39-210(2); 304.39-220(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981).
76 "Overdue payments bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
except that if delay was without reasonable foundation the rate of interest shall be
eighteen percent (18%) per annum." KRS § 304.39-210(2).
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fees77 if its delay in the payment of "overdue" benefits was
"without reasonable foundation. ' 78 Whether a payment is
"overdue" is determined under the guidelines of the Act.79
The Act is a significant step in the right direction to dis-
courage the wrongful withholding of funds by insurers.80 The
Act's interest and attorneys' fees provisions encourage prompt
payment by making it uneconomical for insurers to engage in
forbidden practices. Unfortunately, however, the Act only ap-
plies to overdue benefits payable by motor vehicle reparation
insurers."'
B. Kentucky's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Statute
As the tort of bad faith has gained acceptance throughout
the nation, state legislatures have enacted statutes prohibiting
" If overdue benefits are recovered in an action against the reparation
obligor or paid by the reparation obligor after receipt of notice of the
attorney's representation, a reasonable attorney's fee.. . may be awarded
by the court if the denial or delay was without reasonable foundation.
No part of the fee for representing the claimant in connection with these
benefits is a charge against benefits otherwise due the claimant.
KRS § 304.39-220(1).
7 State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Outlaw, 575 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
:' Benefits are overdue if not paid within thirty (30) days after the repar-
ation obligor receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss
realized, unless the reparation obligor elects to accumulate claims for
periods not exceeding thirty-one (31) days after the reparation obligor
receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss realized, and
pays them within fifteen (15) days after the period of accumulation. If
reasonable proof is supplied as to only part of the claim, and the part
totals one hundred dollars ($100) of more, the part is overdue if not paid
within the time provided by this section.
KRS § 304.39-210(1).
See, e.g., Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. McQueen, 700 S.W.2d 73
(Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 603 S.W.2d 498
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980); 575 S.W.2d at 493.
11 " 'Basic reparation benefits' mean benefits providing reimbursement for net loss
suffered through injury arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle.... ." KRS § 304.39-020(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Supp. 1986). On the
other hand, the statutes of many other states provide interest and attorneys' fees penalties
for all insurers, not just motor vehicle reparation insurers. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 66-3238 (1980) ("In all cases where loss occurs and the cargo, fire, marine, casualty,
fidelity, surety, cyclone, tornado, life, health, accident, medical, hospital, or surgical
benefit insurance company and fraternal benefit society or farmer's mutual aid associ-
ation liable therefore shall fail to pay ... ").
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specific unfair claims practices by insurance companies when
dealing with policy holders.8 2 Most of such legislation is modeled
after The National Association of Insurance Commissioners'
(NAIC) Model Unfair Trade Practices Acts3 and a successor
Model Act84 adopted in 1971.85
The Kentucky General Assembly enacted unfair claims set-
tlement practices legislation in 1984.86 This statute lists fourteen
acts, any of which is an unfair claims settlement practice if
committed or performed "with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice. ' 87 Prohibited practices include "[n]ot
attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably
clear," 88 "[c]ompelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially
less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought
by such insureds," 9 and "[a]ttempting to settle a claim for less
than the amount to which a reasonable man would have believed
he was entitled by reference to written or printed advertising
material accompanying or made part of an application." 90
Unfortunately, the language ("with such frequency as to
indicate a general business practice") of the Kentucky statute
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005 (1980); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104
(1973 & Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404 (1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
1171.5 (Purdon Supp. 1986); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981).
S, "An Act Relating to Unfair Practices in the Business of Insurance," reproduced
at W. FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON TE LAW OF INSURANCE § 51, 199-213 n.13 (5th ed.
1952).
, "An Act Relating to Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive
Acts and Practices in the Business of Insurance," reproduced at Best, Statutes and
Regulations Controlling Life and Health Insurance Claim Practices, 29 DEF. L.J. 115,
152 App. A (1980). See also Underwood, Insurance, 72 Ky. L.J. 403 (1983-84).
85 Underwood, supra note 84, at 403; Best, supra note 84, at 117.
KRS § 304.12-230 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
87 Id. Similar legislation was proposed in 1982 that would have imposed "severe
sanctions for a single violation of a single prohibition." Underwood, supra note 84, at
404 (quoting Best, supra note 84, at 151). However, the 1982 bill could not overcome
insurance industry opposition. See id. at 404, 409. See Harvey and Wiseman, supra note
18, at 184-86 (for a discussion of H.R. 360, 1982 Reg. Sess. (introduced by Rep. Jim
LeMaster)).
- KRS § 304.12-230(6).
- KRS § 304.12-230(7).
KRS § 304.12-230(8).
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renders the statute virtually unenforceable. 91 Regardless of how
egregious the insurer's conduct, no remedy exists unless the
insured proves such conduct is more than an isolated incident. 92
Furthermore, even if the insured can prove the existence of an
unfair claims settlement practice, the statute provides no redress
for the specific injuries of the insured. Instead, the statute merely
empowers the state Insurance Commissioner to issue a cease and
desist order. 93 Such gross deficiencies have earned the statute the
label "toothless. '94
C. Private Right of Action Derived From Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices Statute
In light of the deficient enforcement provisions of Kentucky's
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Statute, a convincing argu-
ment can be made that a private cause of action should be
implied. 95 Kentucky's Trade Practices and Fraud statutes explic-
itly state that "[n]o order of the commissioner ... or order of
court to enforce it shall in any way relieve or absolve any person
affected by such order from any other liability, penalty, or
forfeiture under law." 96 Furthermore, Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) section 446.070 provides that "[a] person injured by the
violation of any statute may recover from the offender such
damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a
penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation. '97
"1 KRS § 304.12-230. See Underwood, supra note 84, at 412 & n.48 (discussion of
the (then proposed) Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices statute and its apparent
enforcement and remedial deficiencies).
'' It must be shown that the insurer has "commit[ted] or perform[ed] [such] acts
with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice" before conduct can be
defined as an unfair claims settlement practice. KRS § 304.12-230. Compare MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 176D, § 3(9) (Law. Co-op. 1977) (Massachusetts Unfair Claim Settlement
Practices statute does not include the language "with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice").
',- "If, after a hearing thereon ... the commissioner finds that any person in this
state has engaged or is engaging in any act or practice defined in or prohibited under
this subtitle, the commissioner shall order such person to desist from such act or
practice." KRS § 304.12-120(l) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981).
'A Underwood, supra note 84, at 412.
Id. at 413.
KRS § 304.12-120(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981).
" KRS § 446.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Allen
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Arguably, the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
Statute, read to create a private right of action by virtue of KRS
sections 304.12-120(4) and 446.070, supplies a vital missing link
to the first party bad faith analysis. In Federal Kemper, the
court stated that "[t]he only fiduciary relationship we recognize
attaching to insurance policies is the excess-of-the-policy-limits
cases where good faith is required on the part of the insurance
company." 93 The Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
Statute provides that "[n]ot attempting in good faith to effec-
tuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which
liability has become reasonably clear"9 9 can constitute an unfair
claims settlement practice. 100 Kentucky courts should equate this
statutory duty with the "fiduciary relationship" embraced in
Feathers'01 and denied in Federal Kemper to provide for punitive
damages when an insurer wrongfully withholds or delays pay-
ment of the amount due under an insurance policy. 0 2
CONCLUSION
The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Federal Kemper
Insurance Co. v. Hornback,'°0 overruling Feathers v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co.,0 4 clearly indicates that Kentucky courts no
longer will recognize the tort of first party bad faith. No fidu-
ciary relationship between the insurer and the insured will be
recognized in first party insurance policies. 05 Punitive damages
v. Lovell's Adm'x, 197 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1946) (court recognized recovery of damages
under KRS § 446.070 where defendant may have violated KRS § 434.280 in destroying
a will).
Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, 711 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Ky. 1986).
KRS § 304.12-230(6) (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU Supp. 1986).
100 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
101 Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 667 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983).
-02 Even if an implied private cause of action is recognized through the application
of KRS § 446.070, such remedy would remain limited to plaintiffs injured by an insurer
who commits unfair claims settlement practices with "such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice." KRS § 304.12-230. A plaintiff harmed by an insurer's solitary
incident of misconduct would be without relief under this theory.
103 711 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1986).
104 667 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
1O See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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will not follow breach of contract, even where an insurer acts
in bad faith.'t 6
Although Federal Kemper has effectively eliminated the tort
of first party bad faith in Kentucky, an injured policyholder
may find limited statutory relief. The Kentucky Motor Vehicle
Reparations Act requires an insurer wrongfully withholding funds
to pay an interest penalty and attorneys' fees in some circum-
stances.'0 7 In addition, the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Statute defines fourteen acts that, if committed with
sufficient frequency, may prompt action by the state Insurance
Commissioner.'0 8 In light of the statute's deficient enforcement
provisions and lack of redress for the specific injuries of the
insured, a private right of action might be implied by its viola-
tion., 09
Garry A. Perry
-, See supra notes 51-54, 60 and accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
, See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
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